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Abstract 
The article aims to make a methodological contribution to the education segregation 
literature, providing a critique of previous measures of segregation used in the literature, 
as well as suggesting an alternative approach to measuring segregation. Specifically, the 
paper examines Gorard et al.’s (2000a, 2003) finding that social segregation between 
schools, as measured by free school meals (FSM) entitlement, fell significantly in the 
years following the 1988 Education Reform Act.  Using Annual Schools Census data 
from 1989 to 2004, the paper challenges the magnitude of their findings, suggesting that 
the method used by Gorard et al. seriously overstates the size of the fall in segregation.  
We make the case for a segregation curve approach to measuring segregation, where 
comparisons of the level of segregation are possible regardless of the percentage FSM 
eligibility.  Using this approach, we develop a new method for describing both the level 
and the location of school segregation. 
1.  Introduction 
It is important for policy makers and researchers to know how socially segregated our 
schools are, yet researchers still disagree on how to measure segregation.  Measuring and 
trying to understand the reasons for changes in school segregation in England is central to 
the evaluation of policies designed to increase choice and competition both in and since 
the 1988 Education Reform Act (see Whitty et al., 1998).  Sociologists have argued that 
these policies would have unintended consequences in terms of stratification of different 
types of pupils across schools.  The central hypothesis is that greater school choice will 
lead to parents/pupils from higher socio-economic groups being more successful than 
those from lower socio-economic groups in choosing the higher performing schools. This 
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in turn will cause these high performing schools to improve still further due to positive 
peer effects from their advantaged intake. This so called virtuous cycle will, it is 
suggested, lead to increasing polarisation between schools in terms of the ability and 
socio-economic background of their intakes (Bourdieu, 1997; Bowe et al., 1994; Halsted, 
1994). 
Whether this increased polarisation is actually happening is an empirical question and a 
sizeable body of evidence has been accumulated. A number of qualitative and smaller 
scale quantitative studies have suggested that there has been increasing polarisation 
between schools.  However, in the late 1990s, a major research programme using large-
scale longitudinal quantitative data, suggested that the opposite had happened in England 
and Wales following the 1988 Act (Gorard, 1997, 1999, 2000; Gorard & Fitz, 1998, 
2000a, 2000b; Gorard & Taylor, 2002a; Gorard et al., 2002).  Using quantitative data on 
the distribution of pupils taking/eligible for free school meals (FSM) across all schools in 
the 1990s, the results from this work suggested that, contrary to most theoretical 
predictions, schools in England and Wales actually became less socially segregated in the 
1990s.  Figure 1 illustrates the level of segregation in the years 1989 to 1999, as 
measured by Gorard’s Segregation Index (GS) and reported in Gorard et al. (2003). 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
This was a controversial finding, given that it contradicted the evidence from previous 
(generally smaller scale) studies. Gorard, Taylor and Fitz’s work then spawned a 
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vigorous debate that continues unabated (Gibson & Asthana, 2000, 2002; Goldstein & 
Noden, 2003; Gorard, 2002; Gorard, 2004; Noden, 2000, 2002).  
Arguments about how best to measure segregation combine normative disagreements 
about what segregation actually is with technical arguments about the desirable properties 
of a segregation index.  The normative debate is important as it guides us as to the 
relative importance of the different technical features of any given index. 
This paper aims to provide an explicit critique of the GS index, proposing an alternative 
approach to measuring segregation.  We conclude that whilst the findings of Gorard et al. 
do hold regardless of measure used, the GS is not the optimal measure for making 
inferences regarding changes in social segregation in schools. This is an important 
contribution, given the extensive use of the GS index in research on school segregation 
(e.g. Gorard & Smith, 2004; Gorard et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2005).  We make a case 
for adopting indices that are consistent with the segregation curve, such as the index of 
dissimilarity or Hutchen’s Square Root index. 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows.  We end this section by giving an overview of 
the data used and a summary of the segregation indices discussed in this article.  Section 
2 provides a normative discussion of the term segregation, along with a more technical 
account of the principles of segregation measurement.  The section introduces the 
segregation curve and the index of dissimilarity (D) as one summary statistic of this 
curve.  Section 3 describes Gorard et al.’s alternative index (the GS) and highlights its 
key features.  Section 4 uses Annual Schools Census data to illustrate the extent to which 
the GS index provides a different pattern of changes in school segregation between 1989 
and 1995 onwards, as compared to alternative measures of segregation such as the 
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dissimilarity index.  It also provides some current empirical evidence on the extent and 
nature of segregation in England.  Section 5 concludes. 
1.1  Data and Summary of Segregation Indices 
Data used throughout this article comes from the Annual Schools Census of English 
secondary schools between 1989 and 2004.  Data from between 1989 and 1995 is used to 
replicate and further analyse Gorard et al.’s original findings.  It uses data based on local 
education authority (LEA) boundaries from before the Local Government reforms.  Data 
from between 1999 and 2004 is used to analyse recent changes in school segregation 
using current LEA boundaries. 
The article focuses solely on social segregation between schools, though the analysis 
could equally be applied to ethnic, gender or other types of segregation.  We use a binary 
indicator for pupils who are either eligible for (after 1993) or in receipt of (pre-1993) free 
school meals (FSM), using this as a proxy for social disadvantage (the drawback of this 
categorisation is discussed elsewhere (Croxford, 2000; Shuttleworth, 1995)).  Throughout 
the article, a pupil eligible for free school meals is labelled ‘FSM’ and a pupil not eligible 
for free school meals is labelled ‘NONFSM’. 
Five different segregation indices are used in different parts of this article to discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of certain axiomatic properties, introduced in the next section.  
A summary of these indices is provided here. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
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2.  A Good Index of Unevenness Segregation 
2.0 Defining segregation 
At a general level, segregation is the degree to which two or more groups are separated 
from each other.  In evaluating school choice policies we are particularly interested in 
whether the distribution of a specific group of pupils across schools in an area has 
become more uneven; where unevenness is the first of five dimensions of segregation 
categorised by Massey and Denton (1988).
1
  We define unevenness as the extent to which 
a school’s share of FSM and NONFSM pupils deviates from the ‘fair share’ they would 
have if FSM and NONFSM pupils were distributed evenly across schools. 
Defining segregation as unevenness reduces a remarkably general term (segregation) to a 
more specific one (unevenness), a step that must be justified.  We choose unevenness 
rather than isolation, for example, because isolation incorporates ideas of both the overall 
size of the minority group and the unevenness in its distribution.  So, we argue that 
because education policy can only influence the latter, unevenness in the distribution of a 
given minority group between schools is the relevant ‘policy lever’ for reducing all types 
of segregation between schools. 
2.1 Segregation curves and segregation indices 
Two group segregation, such as unevenness in the between school distribution of FSM 
versus NONFSM pupils, can be graphically illustrated. Segregation curves show this 
unevenness without the loss of any information and without the need for strong value 
judgements regarding the exact location of unevenness.  Figure 2 shows segregation 
curves created using actual data for a cohort of year 9 students attending school in 
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Gloucestershire LEA in 2002/3.  The segregation curve is developed by first ranking the 
schools in order from the school with the lowest proportion of pupils eligible for FSM up 
to the highest proportion of pupils eligible for FSM, then plotting the cumulative fraction 
of NONFSM pupils on the x axis and cumulative fraction of FSM pupils on the y axis.  
The line of equality represents total evenness where every school has its ‘fair share’ of 
FSM pupils and NONFSM pupils.  Fair share means that if, for example, a school 
educates 16% of the pupils in an LEA, it will also educate 16% of the FSM pupils and 
16% of the NONFSM pupils in the LEA. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Using segregation curves we can always identify whether one distribution of pupils is 
more uneven than another, as long as the two segregation curves in question do not 
intersect.  However, where curves cross, value judgements are required in order to 
produce a complete ranking of segregation between, for example, different areas or 
different points in time (Hutchens, 2004).  The purpose of unevenness segregation indices 
is therefore to produce a complete and unique rank ordering of segregation curves by 
area/time, in essence summarising the extent of segregation across schools in a single 
numerical value. 
There are a set of segregation indices that are solely a function of the segregation curve, 
which means that if the segregation curve lies on the line of equality, the value of the 
index is by definition zero; if the segregation curve traces the x axis because all FSM 
pupils are concentrated in one school, the value of the index should be one.  Importantly, 
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the value of these segregation curve approach indices must, by definition, be lower for 
one segregation curve where it is both closer to the line of equality at all places and does 
not intersect with the other segregation curve.  So, for example in Figure 3, because 
segregation curves I and II are non-overlapping, all segregation curve approach indices 
must place a higher value on the segregation relating to curve II compared to curve I. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
The segregation curve approach to indices is well-established (e.g. Cortese et al., 1976; 
Duncan & Duncan, 1955; Massey & Denton, 1988) precisely because the value of an 
index developed under this method is easily interpretable.  Segregation curve approach 
indices are known as relative indices because the level of segregation is always measured, 
not in an absolute sense, but relative to zero (complete evenness) and one (complete 
segregation), regardless of the relative size of the FSM and NONFSM groups.  It is 
certainly not the only approach in the literature, but we argue that it is the most appealing 
in this context. It allows measurement of the relative level of segregation in any situation, 
is axiomatically well-grounded (as shown in the next section) and has been shown to be 
the logical equivalent of the Lorenz curve approach in the inequality literature (Hutchens, 
1991). 
2.2 Index of dissimilarity 
Continuing the segregation curve approach, this section introduces the index of 
dissimilarity (known as ‘D’ from now on), which is the most popular index of unevenness 
segregation following the review of indices by Duncan & Duncan (1955).  D measures 
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the ‘dissimilarity’ in the distribution of FSM pupils across schools from the distribution 
of NONFSM pupils across schools, is solely a function of the segregation curve and 
represents the maximum vertical distance between the segregation curve and the line of 
equality.  In the context of segregation between schools by free-school meal eligibility, 
measured at LEA level, its formula is: 
 
1
2
school school
school LEA LEA
fsm nonfsm
D
FSM NONFSM
 (1) 
2.3 Axioms of a good segregation index 
There is no ‘perfect’ segregation index: each has different properties and incorporates 
different value judgements about the nature of segregation.  The use of D as the primary 
measure of unevenness segregation in areas such as occupational gender segregation and 
residential racial segregation stems from its meeting certain criteria for a good index, i.e. 
it is 0-1 bounded, is solely a function of the segregation curve and meets a set of 
generally agreed basic axioms reasonably well.  These are adapted from the axioms in 
Hutchens (2004),
2
 but are very similar to those discussed by James & Taeuber (1985).  It 
can be shown that a measure that satisfies these properties will always yield a ranking of 
segregation consistent with the ranking provided by non-intersecting segregation curves 
(Hutchens, 1991). 
P1. Scale or composition invariance – D is invariant to a proportionate increase in FSM 
or NONFSM, providing each school’s share of the sub-group (e.g. FSM) remains 
constant and the distribution of the other sub-group (e.g. NONFSM) does not change.  
This means that if new FSM pupils enter an LEA from outside, causing the number of 
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FSM children to double across the LEA as a whole but the share in each school remains 
the same, the value of the index will not change. 
P2. Symmetry in groups – schools can be relabelled and reordered, yet the value of D 
remains the same.  This means that we are indifferent as to whether school A or school B 
is more segregated; we are simply interested in measuring the extent of segregation 
between the two schools. 
P3. Principle of transfers – D is usually capable of being affected by the movement of 
one individual from school to school.  Intuitively, this means that if a child who is 
eligible for FSM moves from a school with a small proportion of FSM children to a 
school with a high proportion of FSM children, then the index will show that segregation 
has increased.  Strictly, D does not meet this principle in its ‘strong form’, meaning it 
does not distinguish between movements between two schools if both are above, or 
below, the LEA average FSM proportion.  However, it is does capture pupil movements 
from a school with more than their ‘fair share’ of FSM pupils to a school with less than 
their ‘fair share’ of FSM pupils (the ‘weak form’). 
P4. Organisational equivalence – D is unaffected by changes in the number of sub-
areas; for example, if a school is divided into two sub-schools by proportional division, 
then the value of D will not change. 
P5. Symmetry between types - D is symmetric in the sense that pupils with FSM could 
be substituted for NONFSM pupils and vice versa in the formula to produce an identical 
value for D.  We note that there are indices, used in section 4, that are non-symmetric yet 
are still 0-1 bounded and solely a function of the segregation curve. 
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There are other segregation indices that, unlike D, meet the axioms above perfectly; most 
notably an index proposed by Hutchens (2001, 2004) called the Square Root index.  The 
rationale for using D, despite its violation of the principle of transfers, is two-fold.  First, 
unlike the Square Root index it is familiar to researchers, and the Square Root index 
tends to display low values where the level of segregation is quite moderate, as is typical 
in schools.  Second, D is closely related to the GS index that we discuss in the next 
section and therefore seems to be the fairer comparison to GS. 
3.  GS - the ‘Strongly Compositionally Invariant’ Index 
3.0 Gorard’s segregation index (GS) 
Stephen Gorard created his own segregation index (known as GS from now on), 
criticising the appropriateness of D on the basis of a problem they label ‘strong 
compositional variance’ (Gorard & Taylor, 2002b).  This is distinct from the scale or 
composition invariance described above (in Proposition P1).  D is composition invariant 
in that it will not change value if new students entering an LEA causes the number of 
FSM children to rise but proportionately across all schools, i.e. provided that the shape of 
the segregation curve remains the same.  However, if an event takes place that switches 
existing students’ status from NONFSM to FSM (for example, a recession increases 
overall FSM take-up or the measurement of FSM is changed from take-up to eligibility), 
the value of D will alter even if all schools retain their existing share of FSM pupils.  It 
does so because this type of event would alter the unevenness in the distribution of 
NONFSM pupils (Taylor et al., 2000).  For Gorard and Taylor (2002b), this was a 
problem that invalidated D’s use in school segregation research where overall FSM 
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proportions tend to vary from year to year because it is possible for pupils to change 
status from NONFSM to FSM, and vice-versa. 
Gorard et al. rightly identified that the behaviour of an index in the event of an increase 
in FSM eligibility is particularly important in the context of educational research.  They 
suggested that ‘strong compositional invariance’ (SCI) is a desirable feature of an index 
and developed an alternative segregation index (GS) that aims to measure unevenness, 
controlling for proportionate switches in student status to FSM.  In the next section we 
question the desirability of this property.  Whereas D calculates segregation based on the 
difference between the FSM share of pupils and NONFSM share of pupils at each school 
in the LEA, GS calculates segregation based on the difference between the FSM share of 
pupils and the share of total pupils (N) at each school in the LEA. 
GS can actually be calculated by first measuring D and then multiplying D by 1-p, where 
p is the proportion of FSM pupils in the LEA: 
 
1
* 1
2
school school
school LEA LEA
fsm n
GS D p
FSM N
 (2) 
Where the number of FSM pupils increases by scalar λ and by the same proportion in 
every school such that 1 0time time
LEA LEAFSM FSM  and 
1 0time time
school schoolfsm fsm , GS will remain 
constant.  Equation (2) shows that the distribution of NONFSM pupils is not in the 
calculation of GS, therefore the GS index ignores the fact that such a scalar increase in 
the number of FSM pupils will also alter each school’s share of NONFSM pupils. 
Gorard et al. made a strong case that GS was therefore the most appropriate index for 
measuring changes in social segregation between schools over time: 
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The (Gorard) segregation index is the only index we have encountered 
which is thus able to separate the overall relative growth of FSM from 
changes in the distribution of FSM between schools.  It is suitably ironic that 
some commentators in educational research have turned this situation on its 
head and argued that our index is sensitive to changes in composition, while 
the decomposed index of isolation (Noden, 2000) or even unscaled 
percentage point differences (Gibson & Asthana, 2000) are composition 
invariant.  That is how wars start! 
(Taylor et al., 2000) 
Though the desire to create an index that can deal with the phenomenon of pupils 
changing their FSM status was important, GS is a measure of segregation with various 
features that we suggest renders it less desirable to use in measuring segregation between 
schools.  We are not the first to make many of these arguments: Gibson and Asthana 
(2000) and Noden (2000) both reanalysed and discussed some apparently undesirable 
features of GS.  Furthermore, as Gorard rightly points out, his index, or close variants on 
it, has been proposed in the past in other fields.  It’s most cited appearance was as the 
‘WE’ index (which is actually 2*GS) used in an OECD study of Women and 
Employment (Moir & Selby Smith, 1979; OECD, 1980).  However, the WE index has 
not been used in the field of occupational gender segregation since the mid-1980s and the 
findings of the OECD study based on WE have been comprehensively dismissed, for 
many of the same reasons we discuss below.   
3.1 GS is not bounded by 0 and 1 
The GS index is calculated by shrinking the dissimilarity index (D) by a factor of (1-p), 
where p is the overall FSM proportion in the area.  The result is that GS is bounded by 0 
and (1-p), giving it a variable upper limit
3
 so that it can never display a value above (1-p).  
It seems desirable that any index has clear fixed limits, and the convention is that these 
are 0 and 1.  This is a attractive feature because the meaning of complete segregation and 
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complete integration is something that all researchers can agree on, so it seems logical 
that these should display fixed values of 0 and 1.  The value of an index in any particular 
year or area can only have relative meaning with respect to the distance of the value from 
the boundaries of the index.  Where the maximum value is varying according to the 
overall FSM proportion, the range will not be standard in each situation being compared.  
This means the value of the index cannot be standard either. 
Following the argument of Blackburn et al. (1993) in their criticism of WE index, we say 
that it is not possible to directly compare two values of GS that come from indices with 
differing boundaries.  This will always be the case where the comparison groups have 
different overall FSM eligibility, which ironically is the precise situation for which the 
GS was suggested.  As an illustration, in England the FSM proportion rose from 8% in 
1989 to 16% in 1993.  GS is therefore bounded by 0 and 0.92 in 1989, but 0 and 0.84 in 
1993.  The value of GS fell in this period from 0.35 to 0.32, and the GS would describe 
this as a fall in segregation: indeed the value of GS is nearer to evenness (0).  However, 
because the upper bound of the index has also fallen, segregation could also be described 
as being closer to total segregation, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
The implication of the variable upper bound is that when using GS, segregation is always 
relatively low in areas of high FSM eligibility, even if all the NONFSM pupils are 
concentrated in one school.  We argue that this view of the costs of segregation is an 
undesirable one. It implies that the range of possible effects of segregation is smaller 
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where 90% of pupils are FSM eligible (maximum value of GS = 0.1), compared to a 
situation where, say, 5% of pupils are FSM eligible (maximum value of GS = 0.95).  In 
schools data, GS would indicate that segregation in Tower Hamlets (GS = 0.11 with a 
maximum value of 0.40 because p=60%) could never be higher than current levels in 
Buckinghamshire (GS = 0.48 with a maximum value of 0.94), even if Tower Hamlets 
schools became completely segregated.  It is therefore not clear how we can use GS to 
evaluate segregation in these two areas in relation to each other.  We argue that since we 
understand so little about the relationship between school segregation and social welfare, 
this supports the case for using a 0-1 bounded relative index.    Interpretation of 
segregation indices is clearly always complex, but at least where an index is bounded by 
0 and 1 it is ‘fair’ in that all LEAs have the ‘opportunity’ to be more or less segregated 
than one another. 
We do, however, recognise that the absolute value of GS does have a specific meaning 
and Cortese et al. (1976) suggest that it could be used as one indicator of the 
‘displacement’ caused by segregation, which might aid interpretation of D.  Once D is 
calculated, GS or D*(1-p) is the proportion of FSM pupils that would have to exchange 
schools in order to achieve evenness.  D*p is the proportion of NONFSM pupils that 
must exchange schools to achieve evenness and D*2p(1-p) is the proportion of all pupils 
that would have to exchange schools to achieve evenness.
4
 
3.2 GS is not symmetric 
It is well recognised that one cannot switch the ‘labels’ on the FSM and NONFSM pupils 
and get the same value of GS, i.e. that GS is not symmetric.  So, for example, the groups 
of schools in Figure 5 and Figure 6 will have different values of GS even though from an 
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evenness perspective they could be described as identical mirror images of each other.  
We do not argue that symmetry is always a desirable feature of an index; indeed, we 
exploit the non-symmetry of other indices later in this article.  However, where indices 
are not symmetric, interpretation becomes more difficult.  If FSM pupils are separated 
from NONFSM pupils, NONFSM are also separated from FSM pupils, and this implies a 
symmetrical relationship (Blackburn et al., 1993).  Where an index is not symmetric there 
exists two values for the index, and movements in the values may be contradictory 
(Karmel & MacLachlan, 1988).  For example, how can we interpret a situation where 
segregation is said to be falling for FSM pupils, yet rising for NONFSM pupils?  
According to GS, this was the case, for example, in Poole LEA between 1999 and 2004, 
where GSFSM rose by 10% while GSNONFSM fell by 27%.  In fact, between 1999 and 2004, 
GSFSM and GSNONFSM disagreed about whether segregation was falling or rising in half of 
all LEAs. 
In the case of segregation of FSM versus NONFSM pupils, it may be the effect of 
segregation of FSM pupils that is of interest to us.  However this is a normative 
judgement, and in any case using a non-symmetric index does not mean we are placing a 
greater weight on the welfare of the minority group, rather than the welfare of all pupils.  
Indeed, as we have already shown, GS has systematically low values in areas of high 
deprivation. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figures 5 and 6 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
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3.3 The Undesirability of ‘Strong Composition Invariance’ (SCI) 
Gorard et al. argue an index should remain constant if pupils switch their status from 
NONFSM to FSM in such a manner that fsm1=λfsm0 in every school in the LEA, 
allowing all schools to retain their existing shares of FSM pupils as the overall FSM 
proportion rises or falls.  Where an index meets this requirement it can be said to be 
‘strongly composition invariant’ (SCI).  The SCI property means GS would not change in 
these circumstances, yet because a group of pupils have lost their NONFSM status, this 
event will change the distribution of NONFSM pupils across schools.  In fact, the nature 
of the constant proportionate increase in FSM means that the probability that a NONFSM 
child switches to FSM status is higher in schools with the highest FSM proportion.  
Therefore, these (already deprived) schools lose the greatest share of their NONFSM 
pupils, thus increasing the unevenness of the distribution of NONFSM pupils.
5
   
When pupils switch status from NONFSM to FSM, as they did between 1992 and 1993 
because we changed the measurement of FSM from take-up to eligibility, there is no 
reason to presume that the nature of this increase will be a constant proportionate increase 
in FSM in each school (and therefore a large increase in the unevenness of the NONFSM 
pupils).  For this most highly stringent and unlikely of cases, GS will indeed remain 
constant; but in most other cases, including the constant proportionate decrease in 
NONFSM, GS will actually fall.  We therefore assert that GS is not invariant to the 
change in the FSM measure between 1992 and 1993 because this event did not represent 
a constant proportion increase in FSM at each school, and so it can therefore draw no 
conclusions about the change in segregation over this time period. 
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When the SCI property is met, the resulting change in the unevenness of the NONFSM 
pupils changes the shape of the segregation curve.  Thus, no index that has the SCI 
property can be consistent with the segregation curve approach.  Using data for Hackney 
LEA from the same source as that held by Gorard, the segregation curve in figure 7 
provides a graphical illustration of the unevenness in the distribution of FSM and 
NONFSM pupils in 1989 (using take-up) and 1995 (using eligibility, in line with 
Gorard’s analysis).  Since the curves are non-overlapping we can say that unevenness 
segregation in Hackney rose over these 6 years.  However, the value of GS fell from 0.11 
in 1989 to 0.10 in 1995 because the downward effect of the increase in overall FSM 
eligibility on GS outweighed the upward effect of the outward shift in the segregation 
curve; GS being a function of both.  So, the problem of GS incorrectly ranking 
segregation curves is substantive in schools data.  D, which is solely a geometrical 
function of the segregation curve, rose from 0.14 in 1989 to 0.30 in 1995.  GS and D 
disagree on whether segregation actually fell or rose in an LEA between 1989 and 1995 
in 35% of cases.   
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 7 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
By similar argument, it can also be shown that GS incorrectly ranks segregation curves 
for two LEAs in any one year.  As a result, if we placed LEAs in deciles according to 
their value of D and GS in 1995, the two indices would disagree about which decile the 
LEA should be in 63% of cases.  This means that the difference in inferences drawn as a 
result of using D versus GS will be substantial. 
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D is said to be independent of overall FSM eligibility (p) because it is solely a function of 
the segregation curve (Duncan & Duncan, 1955).  The intuition behind this statement is 
that the segregation curve plots the shares of FSM pupils on one axis against the shares of 
the NONFSM pupils on the other.  The distribution of these two groups can be treated as 
independent of each other since no pupil appears in both groups and each axis plots the 
cumulative distribution from 0% to 100%, regardless of the relative size of the two 
groups overall.  Therefore, no part of drawing a segregation curve relies on knowledge of 
the value p.
6
  Since GS = D*(1-p) and D is known to be solely a function of the 
segregation curve, GS is a function of the overall FSM proportion (i.e. p) in the area in 
question.  Indeed any index that is ‘strongly compositionally invariant’, such as GS, must 
partially be a function of the overall FSM proportion, so we can properly describe it as 
‘composition variant’, i.e. it will vary systematically where the overall FSM proportion 
differs. 
4.  Re-examining the Empirical Evidence (1989 to 2004) 
This section re-examines Gorard et al.’s (2003, pages 58-63) presentation of changes in 
the social composition of schools between 1989 and 1995.  It then presents new empirical 
evidence on the extent and nature of segregation within LEAs between 1999 and 2004, 
using various segregation curve consistent measures. 
4.0 (Un) changing School Segregation from 1989 onwards 
Re-analysis of Annual Schools Census data for the years 1989 and 1995 using D 
indicates that Gorard et al. were indeed correct that, nationally, FSM segregation between 
schools fell during this period.  However, by using the GS index with its falling upper 
bound (as the FSM measure rose) they measured a in fall segregation twice as large as 
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that suggested by D: D (measured nationally using FSM take-up in both years) fell by 5% 
from 0.292 in 1989 to 0.277 in 1995; GS fell by 10%.  The picture in individual LEAs 
during this period is more balanced: segregation rose in 42% of (the 107 pre-LGR) LEAs; 
it fell in the remaining 62%.  The national fall is shown in figure 8 to demonstrate that the 
fall in D was highly concentrated in the recession years of 1991 to 1993.   
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 8 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Gorard and others have noted that it is unlikely that the substantial fall in the value of the 
GS index between two consecutive years (it fell 7% between 1991 and 1992) represents 
genuine changes in segregation caused by choice, as opposed to the impact of the 
recession.  Our sub-unit of analysis is the entire secondary school so it would take five 
years to completely replace the school population and for the full effect of increased 
choice to emerge.  So, if genuine changes in segregation explained such a substantial fall 
in the GS index over the two year period, surely segregation would have continued to fall 
at a similar rate in the following few years; yet it did not.
7
 
4.1 Recent changes in social segregation between schools 
Over the five year period of 1999 to 2004, the empirical evidence paints a mixed picture 
of rising social segregation between schools in 60% of LEAs and falling segregation in 
40% (see table 2).  School segregation has risen fastest in London, with a mean increase 
in D of 9% over the period.  Indeed static or rising segregation is the trend in most 
regions, although the South East region has seen a dominant trend of falling segregation. 
However, these regional trends hide inter-LEA differences within regions: even in the 
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South East 37% of LEAs actually saw a rise in segregation over the period, despite the 
downward regional trend.     
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Identifying the causes of changes in the level of segregation across LEAs is essentially 
impossible in this dataset. However, one can look at associations between changes in D 
and LEA characteristics. Our results, consistent with work of other researchers, suggest 
that school closure continues to be associated with falling segregation.  Regression of the 
percentage change in D between 1999 and 2004 in table 3 confirms this relationship
8
. 
Table 3 also shows that areas with higher proportions of grammar schools have not 
generally been associated with falling segregation, but where there has been a growth in 
the proportion of pupils at grammar schools segregation appears to have fallen.  This is 
consistent with the known correlation between FSM eligibility and ability: as grammar 
schools expand they accept pupils from lower down the ability spectrum and therefore 
their FSM share increases (albeit from extremely low levels to very low levels). 
Interestingly, areas with a higher proportion of pupils at voluntary-aided faith schools in 
1999 have seen greater growth in segregation.  Where these VA schools have grown in 
size, increasing their share of pupils in the LEA, this is again associated with increasing 
segregation.  Once again, it would be unwise to attribute causation of this phenomenon to 
the behaviour of VA schools. 
----------------------------------------------- 
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Insert table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Different Locations of Segregation 
Focusing solely on levels of segregation may, however, mask different patterns in the 
distribution of FSM pupils within LEAs.  Drawing segregation curves for two LEAs with 
equal values of D (0.38), such as those in figure 9 illustrates this idea clearly.  Lambeth’s 
segregation curve is very steep on the far right hand side of the graph, suggesting a large 
proportion of low-income pupils are concentrated in one or two schools.  Birmingham’s 
segregation curve is very flat on the left hand side of the graph, suggesting a set of 
schools in the LEA with very few low income pupils.  Clearly there are potentially 
different policy implications for these two different manifestations of the same level of 
segregation. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 9 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
We use a set of segregation-curve-consistent indices called the Generalized Entropy 
Measures of Segregation (Hutchens, 2004) to distinguish between these different patterns 
of FSM pupils in LEAs.  The formula for these indices is: 
 1 , 0 1
c
school
school LEA
c
schoolschool LEA
LEA
fsm
nonfsm FSM
O x where c
nonfsmNONFSM
NONFSM
 (3) 
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Where c = 0.5, the index is symmetrical and is termed the Square Root index; otherwise 
they are non-symmetrical and it is this feature that allows us to use them to distinguish 
between LEAs with ‘concentrations of disadvantage’ as compared to ‘concentrations of 
advantage’.  We use a log ratio of the values of O0.1(x) and O0.9(x) (the choice of 0.1 and 
0.9 being quite arbitrary) to rank LEAs in terms of their tendency to display 
‘disadvantaged’ versus ‘advantaged’ segregation, where 0 indicates no skewness, positive 
values indicate increasing concentrations of advantage and negative values indicate 
increasing concentrations of disadvantage: 
 0.1
0.9
log
O x
segregation skew
O x
 (4) 
Table 4 shows that English LEAs typically show concentrations of advantage and that 
these are most pronounced in the West Midlands region.  Reading LEA shows the 
greatest concentration of advantage at +0.71.  By contrast, Brighton & Hove LEA shows 
the greatest tendency towards concentrations of disadvantage.  It should be emphasised 
that the value of the segregation skew does not indicate the absolute level of 
concentration of disadvantage or advantage, rather the tendency towards a concentration 
of disadvantage/advantage for any given level of segregation.   
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
4.3 Describing changes in segregation curves using a set of indices 
When the level of segregation changes in an LEA, it is possible to describe quite 
precisely the nature of this change.  Segregation might increase as a result of the school 
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with the most deprived intake increasing its share of FSM pupils further, thereby 
concentrating disadvantage. Alternatively, segregation might increase if the school with 
the fewest FSM pupils reduces its share of FSM pupils, thereby concentrating advantage.  
Using Reading LEA in figure 10 as an example, we suggest that four values can be used 
to describe both the level and changes in segregation as follows: 
(a) the general level of school segregation can be represented by a symmetrical 
segregation curve approach index, such as D or Hutchen’s Square Root index (i.e. 
O0.5(x)).  So, for Reading LEA the level of FSM segregation in 1999 was D=0.28, which 
is higher than the typical LEA (64
th
 highest of 148 LEAs). 
(b) the skew of school segregation – concentrations of ‘advantage’ versus 
‘disadvantage’ – can be measured using 
)(
)(
log
9.0
1.0
xO
xO
skewnsegregatio .  For 
Reading LEA the skew in 1999 was +0.74, one of the highest in the country (rank 12 of 
148). 
(c) the increase in school segregation can be represent by the growth in a symmetrical 
index.  For Reading LEA, the growth in FSM segregation between 1999 and 2004 was 
2% (lower than the typical LEA). 
(d) the location of the change in school segregation, or change in skew, can be 
measured using a ratio indicating the relative skew in the two years: 
 
0.1 2004
0.9 2004
0.1 1999
0.9 1999
log
O x
O x
segregation skew
O x
O x
 (5) 
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Here a value of 0 indicates that there is no change in the skewness of segregation; a 
positive value indicates that the increase in segregation is located in the most advantaged 
schools; a negative value indicates that the increase in segregation is located in the most 
disadvantaged schools.  For Reading LEA the value is -0.03, suggesting that Reading 
schools where the FSM proportion was already high in 1999 have increased their share of 
FSM pupils, thus increasing segregation.  This is consistent with Figure 10. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 10 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
Figure 11 shows Brighton & Hove LEA had a low level of segregation in 1999 (D = 
0.14), but it has risen significantly over the five year period to 2004 (growth = 37%).  The 
skew in the segregation curve suggests concentrations of disadvantage, with one or more 
schools whose FSM eligibility is significantly above the LEA average (segregation skew 
= -0.12).  This skew towards concentrations of disadvantage has increased (Δ segregation 
skew = -0.09). 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert figure 11 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
5.  Concluding Comments 
Gorard and Fitz were the first to use large-scale datasets to challenge the ‘crisis account’ 
that school choice would result in increasing social segregation.  Using alternative 
measures, we agree with Gorard et al.’s main conclusion that there has been no 
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substantial across the board increase in socio-economic segregation between schools in 
the majority of LEAs since the Education Reform Act of 1988.  However, our methods 
do generate substantively different results to those produced by Gorard et al..  Figures 
derived from D show a decline that was only half as large as that suggested by GS.  Our 
results also suggest policymakers should not dismiss the potential ‘crisis’ of rising school 
segregation.  Our evidence suggests rising segregation in many LEAs, particularly in 
London and in LEAs with high proportions of pupils educated at voluntary-aided schools.   
We suggest that the GS index is not the optimal way of measuring changes in school 
segregation because: 
1. GS is not bounded by 0 and 1: the upper boundary varies according to FSM 
eligibility, so GS is better described as an ‘indicator’ rather than an index of 
segregation; 
2. GS is not symmetric, meaning that it is capable of showing that FSM segregation 
is rising and NONFSM segregation is falling simultaneously; and 
3. GS is actually systematically variant to changes in overall FSM eligibility, except 
in the most stringent and unlikely of circumstances.  It has a tendency to fall as 
FSM eligibility rises, regardless of the change in the unevenness of school’s 
shares of FSM and NONFSM pupils. 
D and GS are closely related and measure similar aspects of unevenness segregation, but 
it is substantively important which index is selected.  D and GS will only be highly 
correlated where levels of FSM eligibility do not vary greatly, and this is not the case 
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across schools data.  We recognise that the GS index has meaning. It can be used, for 
example, to count the proportion of FSM pupils that would have to switch schools to 
achieve evenness.  However, in this paper we have made the case for a segregation curve 
approach to measuring segregation, where comparisons of the level of segregation are 
possible regardless of the percentage FSM eligibility (p).  These indices are 0-1 bounded, 
thus measuring the relative level of segregation compared to complete evenness and 
complete segregation.  Though we have relied on the dissimilarity index for much of this 
article, we do not claim its superiority over other segregation curve consistent indices.  
Researchers wanting to take a segregation curve approach should choose the index that 
aligns most closely with their view of the effects of segregation on social welfare. 
We do not want to overstate the case for a segregation curve approach.  It cannot separate 
out the change in segregation due to school choice as compared to processes that change 
overall FSM eligibility (we take the view that it is not possible to construct an index to do 
this).  It measures the effect of segregation in an area relative to the maximum possible 
effect if pupils were completely segregated, yet we recognise that the effect of 
segregation on social welfare may differ in areas of high deprivation versus low 
deprivation.  Finally, we recognise that unevenness is not the only dimension of 
segregation; therefore researchers will continue to use other approaches too. 
Deciding how best to measure segregation is complex, combining normative judgements 
about what one intends to measure, with more technical judgements about the appropriate 
properties of the chosen measure.  We believe we have made a case for a specific 
approach, being open about the normative judgements we have made to reach our 
conclusion.  We have chosen to criticise one popular alternative approach to measuring 
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segregation, GS. Further research is needed to subject alternative methods, such as 
multilevel modelling or the isolation index, to the same level of scrutiny. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 The other dimensions being exposure (isolation), concentration (the amount of physical space occupied by 
the minority group), clustering (the extent to which minority neighbourhoods abut one another), and 
centralisation (proximity to the centre of the city). 
2
 These five principles relate to Hutchen’s axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7.  Axioms 5 and 6 relate to an ability to 
aggregate and additively decompose a segregation index; D does not satisfy these axioms. 
3
 We define an upper limit as being the value of an index when each school either has only FSM pupils or 
only NONFSM pupils; and never has a mixture of the two. 
4
 Note that 2*p(1-p) is the maximum possible value of the weighted sum of the absolute deviations of the 
FSM proportion for each school: 
I
i
i
i pp
N
n
1
, where pi is the FSM percentage in school i. 
5
 In practical terms this actually means that a large constant proportionate increase in FSM is often not 
achievable because the most deprived school does not have enough NONFSM pupils to lose.   
6
 The segregation curve approach is not the only way to demonstrate the independence of the value of D to 
changes in p: Zoloth (1976) gives a short mathematical decomposition of D’s formula to show the same 
result. 
7
 Using FSM take-up, GS is 0.353 in 1991; 0.329 in 1992; 0.308 in 1993; 0.298 in 1994; 0.300 in 1995. 
8
 Though we do not discuss it in this article, we recognise that D should only be cautiously used as a 
dependent variable in a regression for two reasons.  First, its use as a dependent variable means that we 
treat the values of the index as having cardinal meaning, so we would only want to do this where we 
accepted the linear payoff criterion of D as being appropriate given our view of segregation and social 
welfare.  Second, we recognise that D displays a systematic random allocation bias where the value is non-
zero even under random allocation and the extent of the bias depends on various features of each LEA. 
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Figure 1: Values of Gorard’s Segregation Index (GS) 
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.37
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
G
o
r
a
r
d
's
 S
eg
r
e
g
a
ti
o
n
 I
n
d
e
x
 
 
Figure 2: The FSM Segregation Curve for Gloucestershire LEA 
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Figure 3: Two Non-Overlapping Segregation Curves 
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Figure 4: Comparing the Value of Gorard’s Segregation Index between 1989 and 1993 
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Figure 5: GS is 0.23 Figure 6: GS is 0.07 
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Figure 7: The Rise in Segregation in Hackney between 1989 and 1995 
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Figure 8: The Fall in School Segregation between 1989 and 1995 
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Figure 9: Segregation Curves for Lambeth and Birmingham 
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Figure 10: Increase in FSM Segregation in Reading 
 
Below is an alternative version of figure 10.  The editor can select the version that is 
likely to print the best. 
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Figure 11: Increase in FSM Segregation in Brighton & Hove 
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Table 1: Summary of Segregation Indices 
Name Formula Description 
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Index of 
Dissimilarity 
(D) 
1
2
school school
school LEA LEA
fsm nonfsm
D
FSM NONFSM
 
A relative measure of unevenness segregation 
that compares the FSM share in each school 
to the NONFSM share in each school. 
     
Gorard’s 
Segregation 
Index (GS) 
1
2
school school
school LEA LEA
fsm n
GS
FSM N
 
An absolute measure of the proportion of 
FSM pupils that would have to exchange 
schools in order to achieve evenness. 
     
Square Root 
Index 
(Generalised 
Entropy 
Measure 
c=0.5) 
0.5
0.5 1
school
school LEA
schoolschool LEA
LEA
fsm
nonfsm FSM
O x
nonfsmNONFSM
NONFSM
 
The only fully ‘segregation-curve-consistent’ 
and symmetric index, developed by Hutchens 
(2001, 2004). 
     
Generalised 
Entropy 
Measure of 
Segregation 
(c=0.1) 
0.1
0.1 1
school
school LEA
schoolschool LEA
LEA
fsm
nonfsm FSM
O x
nonfsmNONFSM
NONFSM
 
A non-symmetric relative measure of 
unevenness segregation that places a greater 
weight on schools with ‘concentrations of 
advantage’. 
     
Generalised 
Entropy 
Measure of 
Segregation 
(c=0.9) 
0.9
0.9 1
school
school LEA
schoolschool LEA
LEA
fsm
nonfsm FSM
O x
nonfsmNONFSM
NONFSM
 
A non-symmetric relative measure of 
unevenness segregation that places a greater 
weight on schools with ‘concentrations of 
disadvantage’. 
     
Note:  fsmschool and nonfsmschool are the number of pupils with and without free school meals in a school, respectively. 
FSMLEA and NONFSMLEA are the number of pupils with and without free school meals in the LEA, respectively. 
nschool and NLEA are the number of pupils in the school and LEA, such that fsmschool+nonfsmschool=nschool. 
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Table 2: Changes in LEA segregation between 1999 and 2004 
 
No. of 
LEAs 
Average 
change in 
D 
Greatest 
LEA fall 
Greatest 
LEA rise 
% of 
LEA with 
higher D 
in 2004 
% of 
LEA with 
lower D 
in 2004 
South East 19 -2% -26% 37% 37% 63% 
East of England 10 1% -16% 13% 70% 30% 
East Midlands 9 2% -15% 10% 56% 44% 
West Midlands 14 3% -20% 27% 50% 50% 
Yorkshire & The Humber 15 3% -19% 24% 60% 40% 
England 148 3% -38% 58% 60% 40% 
South West 15 3% -20% 19% 47% 53% 
North East 12 4% -38% 37% 67% 33% 
North West 22 6% -11% 25% 77% 23% 
London 32 9% -16% 58% 69% 31% 
 
Table 3: Regression of Percentage Change in Segregation 99-04 
Number of obs. 148 (weighted for LEA size) 
Adj R-squared 0.26   
Coefficient Estimate S.E.  
Population density 0.00 0.00 Not significant 
Dissimilarity in 1999 -0.47 0.16 Significant at 1% 
Proportion of pupils at VA schools in 1999 0.24 0.10 Significant at 5% 
Proportion of pupils at grammar schools in 1999 0.10 0.11 Not significant 
Proportion of pupils at foundation schools in 1999 0.01 0.04 Not significant 
Proportion of pupils at CTC/academy schools in 1999 -1.36 0.44 Significant at 1% 
Change in number of pupils in LEA 0.07 0.23 Not significant 
Change in number of schools 0.32 0.13 Significant at 5% 
Change in LEA FSM proportion 0.08 0.10 Not significant 
Change in proportion at VA schools 0.12 0.06 Significant at 5% 
Change in proportion at grammar schools -0.36 0.16 Significant at 5% 
Change in proportion at foundation schools 0.14 0.12 Not significant 
Change in proportion at CTC/academy schools 0.04 0.10 Not significant 
Constant 0.13 0.05 Significant at 1% 
 
Table 4: Skewness in the Segregation Curve 
Name of Region 
No. of 
LEAs 
Mean 
ratio 
LEAs with greatest 
concentration of 
disadvantage 
LEAs with greatest 
concentration of 
advantage 
Yorkshire & The Humber 15 +0.01 -0.14 (Rotherham) +0.17 (Bradford) 
East Midlands 9 +0.03 -0.05 (Leicestershire) +0.13 (Lincolnshire) 
East of England 10 +0.04 -0.12 (Bedfordshire) +0.14 (Peterborough) 
North East 12 +0.05 -0.06 (Newcastle) +0.21 (Stockton-on-Tees) 
South West 15 +0.06 -0.13 (Swindon) +0.22 (Wiltshire) 
England 148 +0.07 -0.21 (Brighton & Hove) +0.71 (Reading) 
South East 19 +0.07 -0.21 (Brighton & Hove) +0.71 (Reading) 
North West 22 +0.08 -0.08 (Rochdale) +0.33 (Manchester) 
London 32 +0.11 -0.20 (Lambeth) +0.30 (Westminster) 
West Midlands 14 +0.12 -0.05 (Sandwell) +0.33 (Telford & Wrekin) 
 
